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| AYURVEDA |
Spontaneous Origin of Living Matter
The mechanistic view of life implies that if at any instance of time we were to know the precise distribution of the matter and energy which are present in an organism, we should have a complete understanding of all its properties. In other words, the behaviour of living systems can be completely defined in terms of laws that are fundamentally similar to those which describe the behaviour of inanimate systems. But the theory of the spontaneous evolution of the animate from the inanimate, though it may give us a comfortable feeling of continuity of thought, is on the whole untenable. It is just as probable for a stone to leaps spontaneously from the surface of the earth as for a living organism to evolve spontaneous!, from inanimate matter. The probability of simultaneous co-ordinate movement such as we find in living organisms is extremely small on the assumption of a purely physical-chemical arrangement. The organization of the simplest living organism is clearly more complex than that of a stone or of a motor car and it carries out processes that are infinitely more complex than what can be explained as chance coincidences. No chemist can seriously think that the proteins can spontaneously originate from carbon-dioxide, water and simple salt, any more than a physicist can admit the spontaneous origin of a motor car. Biology itself provides not one shred of observational evidence to support the spontaneous origin of living matter. There are a few biologists, however, who postulate the spontaneous origin of the intermediate stages between the living and the non-living world. But the physical events that have to be assumed in such a theory are such that our present concept of physical “laws” can hardly be applied there. It may be said that in past ages events which are now very improbable were, in fact, of common occurrence. But no man of science can give any credence to such a supposition unless he had some assurance as to the nature of those events and conditions which made the origin of life inevitable or even probable. The distribution of energy and of matter in past epochs may have been different but if there were conditions prevalent at the time which could produce the living organisms through the spontaneous co-ordination of matter and material energy, it would be extremely strange that every attempt to reproduce them in the laboratory should fail so completely. If the spontaneous origin of the animate from the inanimate cannot be held as a plausible theory, there is no ground for hoping that we shall ever be able to express all the properties of an organism in terms of physical laws. Under the circumstances it would be more logical to accept the existence of matter in two states, the animate and the inanimate, as a fundamental initial assumption. Some properties are naturally common to matter in either state and it is therefore legitimate to study the so-called physical properties of living matter. But just as the fundamental concepts of physics must be based on observed facts, so the fundamental concepts of biology must also be based upon observation in that specific sphere.
Individuality (Ahan –Kaaram)
From one point of view a mass of protoplasm may be regarded as a very fine colloidal emulsion, the fundamental units of which are extremely small. The properties of the whole may thus in some sense be regarded as being essentially those of each individual. There is some evidence to show that even a single differentiated cell represents an aggregate of very small living units. Even a single spermatozoon shows the growth and decline of its mechanical and respiratory activities in such a manner as if it represented the joint behaviour of a large population of much smaller units of activity. Yet when we try to think of the mechanism whereby the cell differentiates itself as a whole, we have to postulate some form of co-ordinated relationship which is more than additive and which cannot be explained except as an organized behaviour of a total indivisible agent. If so long physical concepts were fruitlessly applied for the explanation of biological facts the time has come when biological concepts are being employed to explain physical behaviour. M. Poincare and others really define physical phenomena in terms of biological conceptions when they say that “modern physics is presenting us with apparent examples of spontaneity and foresight.” When the dividing cells of a molluscan egg rotate in order to reduce their centripetal pressure, the rotation in the clockwise direction. But in every case it takes one direction rather than the other, through no mechanical difference of the inside force arrangement can be served. The cells of a molluscan egg turn one way or another for intrinsic reasons quite independent of any external influence. This and many other considerations of a similar nature show that the cell has an individuality of its own which is free from the limitations of the statistical laws of physics. Probably this may be extended to the minutest living components of the dividing cell. We are now in a position to assert that a living organism-or even the minutest parts of it – behaves as an individual and determines itself in consonance with both its own nature and its immediately associated life-entities and probably also with its external environment. Every case of its self-determination is also a case of other-determination. The variability of Darwin’s law is the function of this self-determination. The concept of self-determination does not imply the exclusion of the need of others, but it involves within it both its own self-expression and the expression of others. Its individuality is not negative and abstract, but is positive and concrete in the sense that its very consideration for itself is also a consideration for others with which it is associated.
Whole Expression
Coming back to the problem of causation, we find that though from the ultimate point of view of determination of all causal operation is based upon the fundamental nature of the neutral reals (Gunas), yet each individual organization, be it material or organic, may be regarded as different individual organizations each of which involves the relevant `other’ of it within itself. This also has its ground in the very nature of the different reals which co-operate together for self-expression, other-expression and whole-expression. Thus the statement that like co-operates with like or like is produced from like is as true as that like co-operates with unlike or that like is produced from unlike. All dialectical discussions on the subject prove to be barren simply because of the fact that the concrete nature of the process is ignored and emphasis is put upon abstract generalities which exist nowhere excepting in the brains of the quarrelling metaphysicians.
Independent sphere of Life
From the above considerations we come to the important conclusion that the sphere of the living is in a very relevant sense an independent sphere which has its own concept and own laws that may be known by observations and experiments, just as the laws of the inorganic world may be known. We know also that all the higher forms of life contain within them as integrated in their history the dominant potential tendencies and functions of the lower forms of life, just as even the most complex inorganic compounds contain within their history the tendencies and functions of electronic matter. The behaviour of any higher form of life can be revealed in its historical aspect only as involving within it all the lower forms as also a tendency towards further history in its further higher forms. Each form below the highest represent within it a process of events which can be interpreted only by a backward and forward oscillation of the mind in search of an integrated meaning.
Independent Sphere of Mind
(1) Just as in the case of life, it has been shown that it is a definite and independent world by itself having its own growth, function, structure and reactions to environment determined by itself, so in the case of mind also, we have to assume its existence as an independent world having its own inner history integrated within it which regulates its growth, function, structure and reactions to environment determined by its own specific laws. There is a difficulty, however, in making any definite assertions about the nature of ‘mind’ and its definite conception. In the case of living units, their processes consisting of physico-chemical changes were directly observable. The inference in their case was with reference to their specific inner urge that regulated their co-coordinating movements. But in the case of mind we have no sensual evidence of any organized whole. The phenomena of mind as thoughts, emotions and volitions can be observed by introspection or can be inferred from the manner in which they induce physiological changes or changes in the movement of the organism in consonance with changes in the environment. These may be studied to some extent, using the methods of exact science which involve definite measurements made under standard conditions. These experiments may be performed by oneself or by two persons, the observer who makes the introspection and the experimenter who handles the instruments and makes the record. But even in these there are obvious difficulties in carrying out the introspective work. There is always a chance of its being unduly affected by the temperamental characteristics of the observer and the ** emotion, and image or the like. (3) There have been philosophers and religious teachers who have denied the existence of any organized whole as ‘mind’. Thus the Buddha said that there were the petals, the pollens, the corolla, the stalk, and the like but there was no lotus; similarly, there is this or that passing idea, passing emotion, images and their momentary aggregate, but there is no organized whole behind them which can be called the mind or the ego or the self. (4). Again there have been philosophers on the other side who, judging from the fact that all our assertions regarding extra-mental objects are dependent upon our various modes of awareness as sensations, ideas, emotions and relations denied the existence of the extra mental entities and regarded them either as wholly nonexistent or as modes of our thought. It has been supposed by many of them that all our knowledge of the objective world is of a relational nature enunciated in an ideational form and regulated by the fundamental laws of thought of identity and contradiction. Sensations, images, ideas and relations are mental and as such it is only the mind that exists. (5). There are others who think that relations have both an external and an internal reality and the mind is like a window. The perception of an event is the occurrence of a relational event both inside and outside the mind. The presence of the occurrence in the mind does not in any way involve any change in the nature of the occurrence and it leads only to the phenomenon we call awareness. (6) There are others who are prepared to regard mind as a combined totalized concept of the various physiological functions which express themselves in the behaviour of the organism.
Ultimate Nature of Mental Phenomena
These divergences of opinion are due to a fundamental advantage and disadvantages of the ** the mind. Though intimately associated with a physiological organism the processes of which take place in a definite spatio-temporal situation, the mind apparently has no such limitation. The modes of its working, the laws of its relationing, retaining, reviving, discriminating or assimilating, determine the nature of all our scientific knowledge and its acquisition. It is true that most mental phenomena are associated with physiological neural and biochemical changes in the body, but these changes are so very different from the associated mental factors that even by the wildest stretch of imagination they cannot be regarded as their modifications. If the biological entities cannot be regarded as functions of the physico-chemical process, it is infinitely more impossible to regard the mental phenomena as the functions of the biological world. It is not possible to give any reply to the question as to what may be the ultimate nature of the mental phenomena and we know that it is equally impossible to say any thing about the ultimate biological units or the ultimate units of matter. We cannot define anything except in terms of behaviour. We know that probably each and every conscious mental phenomenon has its correlative in the physiological condition of the body, particularly in the neural substances in the brain. In our bodies there are two more or less distinct systems, the relation of one of which to the mental phenomena must at any rate be distant. Thus the normal movements of heart, respiratory muscles, blood vessels and intestines are generally regarded as being largely unaccompanied by any kind of conscious emotion. But even in their case we know that strong emotions or deep concentration produce great changes in the functioning of these processes. The other system, namely, the neuro-cerebral **.
Mental and Bio-chemical Phenomena
Studies in biochemistry show that corresponding to the various phases of our emotions there are probably produced various kinds of secretory chemical compounds. We know that when there is a strong emotion or mental excitement, it affects the adrenal glands through certain nerves and leads to the secretion of an increased amount of adrenine from the medulla. This output of adrenine has its twofold effect, a general “stringing up” of the organism thought he increasing blood-pressure, and mobilization of a liver-glycogen to produce a heightened level of blood sugar. The animal is thus conditioned, but as yet we know nothing of the mechanism by which adrenine is produced in the gland. It is known to us to be present in the poison gland of the tropical toads. Thus we see that the mental processes of emotion, attention, and the like produce physiological and bio-chemical changes which are in consonance with them. We know also that though the neuro-cerebral system is more directly and intimately associated with mental phenomena, the muscular system of the body and the organism as a whole are also influenced by the mental changes. If we try to find any criterion of mind even in levels lower than the human mind, we see that the introspective process by which the mental phenomena are revealed to the perceiver cannot be of any avail. As regards the presence of mind in human beings other than ourselves we have also no direct evidence, but we have to accept their testimony as supported by corroborative behaviour and observable behaviour, physical and physiological changes. If we have to observe the objective existence of mind in other fellow-beings or in animals, it can only be done by the joint application of the deductive and the inductive methods. The objective ** mechanical regularity in response to external stimulus, but are variable in accordance with the inner conditions of the living being. Judgments in individual cases may remain doubtful, for most biological processes are largely automatic and unconscious and are selective towards the adoption of means with reference to particular means. But a close observation of the nature of living beings may enable us to decide between the two alternatives, that is, whether the determination is primarily biological or mental.
Consciousness
The observation of experts on the subject leads almost unanimously to the view that consciousness is a universal possession of living organisms from man down to the protozoa. [*Principles of Physiological Psychology by Wundt, London, 1-10. P.20.] In the lowest stages the processes of consciousness are restricted to very narrow limits and the will is determined by the universal organic impulses in the very simplest manner; yet the manifestations of the life even among the protozoa are explicable only upon the hypothesis that they possess a mind. The amoeba, which morphologically is only the single cell with a nuclear protoplasmic body, will return after a short time to the starch particles that it accidentally came upon and will take in a new portion of it for the nutrition of its body. The infusion pursues others which they kill and devour. This shows that the choice of means for the furtherance of their biological satisfaction is determined inwardly by some kind of mental process as it cannot be explained as a result of any mechanical or chemical influence. We cannot however say anything definitely as to whether mind emerges only at the stage of protozoic life or whether it can be supposed to extend to still lower stages, that is, whether mind can be affirmed of every living organism. There are some grounds for asserting the fact that whatever living protoplasms occur there are certain phenomena which are akin to mental, which possess a determining activity not explainable by physico-chemical influences. It is evident the mental characteristics other than voluntary cannot be demonstrated in these lower forms of life where there are no means of communication. Thus Wundt says that from the stand-point of observation we must regard it as a highly probable hypothesis that the beginnings of the mental life date from as far back as the beginnings of life at large. Fetcher goes even further in expressly attributing consciousness to the earth and the other heavenly bodies, making the cosmic consciousness the whole, of which the individual forms of consciousness in plants and animals are parts. Such hypothesis emphasize the intrinsic impossibility of the view that mental life suddenly appears at some point of time and space as a new thing and that we need not seek for its general conditions in the universal substrate of the vital processes. Such theories imply further metaphysical speculations into which we need not enter.
Result of Modification of Trigunas
But from what has been said we may assume that the psychosis of mind as much has to be admitted as having a sphere of its existence which on the one hand, is associated with the physiological and physical substrate and on the other hand, is an independent existence having its own inner laws of determination. The concept of the psychical sphere has to be formed on the obvious analogy of the biological sphere and the biological sphere is associated with the physico-chemical sphere. As the biological sphere is on the one hand associated with physico-chemical sphere and yet has its own-independent determinant principle in accordance with which the former maintains its relations with the latter, so the psychical sphere or the mind is also an independent sphere which can manifest in its diverse forms and ways only in association with a definite physiological system and physico-chemical environments. The psychical sphere in accordance with our theory has a definite substratum and reality, being the result of the modification of the neutral reals (Trigunas). As such it has its own existence by itself, but it can manifest itself only with the help of suitable physiological and physico-chemical organizations. The fact that things may exist without manifesting themselves is so obvious that it is not necessary for us to enter into any long discussion about that. A ray of light and an eye may both exist, but the condition of visibility can arise only when the former is reflected from a surface to the latter. The sound waves may be there but it is only within a certain range and in the presence of the ear that they can manifest themselves. The long waves of wireless or the short waves of X-ray manifest themselves only under the conditions of suitable mechanical apparatus. According to our assumption, then, the psychical sphere and the living sphere have been both existing, for aught that we know even when the earth was undergoing nebular changes. The material the living and the psychical may all three be independent organizations of which the last may manifest under the conditions of the first two and the second may manifest under the conditions of the first, or it may also be. That the second is a relative function due to the varying degrees of co-operation of the first and the last. But we need not enter into the further metaphysical implications or discussions of such a situation for our present purposes. What we are interested to affirm is that mind or the psychic sphere does not consist of passing waves of consciousness and emotion, but that these constitute together an integrated whole which has its own laws of behaviour and operation in consonance with the operation of its internal laws and constituents and with its intimate physiological, biochemical and physico-chemical environments. Mental efforts determine metabolic changes involve expenditure of energy and expenditure of energy is dependent upon the intake of energy through the assimilation of physical food. Thus mind determines not only physiological conditions but also physic-conditions. On the other hand metabolic changes may induce various types of mental states. The consumption of alcohol may produce exhilaration and the smelling of chloroform may induce a semi-conscious or unconscious state. From the superficial point of view one system of organization may seem to be determining the other and be determined by it: but a keener appraisal of the entire situation shows that each system works independently by itself according to its own constitutional laws only under the co-operative conditions of other systems of organization.
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